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Sullivan: Remedying Athlete-Agent Abuse: A Securities Law Approach

COMMENT
REMEDYING ATHLETE-AGENT ABUSE: A
SECURITIES LAW APPROACH
MICHAEL

I.

J. SULLIVAN*

INTRODUCTION

Most athletes entering the world of professional sports require
an agent to assist them in securing the best possible contractual
agreement. Because the only qualification for becoming an agent is
having a client, the great majority of agents lack either the training
or the integrity necessary to fulfill the needs of the athlete. To
compound the problem, the athlete being represented is often either too busy or too inexperienced in the workings of law and business to evaluate the agent's capabilities.1
Ironically, part of the blame for the problem of agent abuse
can be placed on the American Bar Association (ABA). To date,
the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits qualified
attorneys from soliciting athletes as clients.2 Consequently, underqualified non-attorney-agents often lure athletes into signing
agency agreements before they can research the market for a qualified representative. State regulation aimed at the problem has
been, unsurprisingly, impotent. The California approach for example, which seeks to establish licensing standards for non-attorneyagents, is currently being ignored.8
This article focuses on the inherent potential for abuse in the
agency relationship between the athlete and his agent. The discussion of possible solutions includes the relaxation of ABA anti-solicitation rules, a possible exemption based on the first amendment,
state regulation and finally, a securities law approach. A securities
Yale University (B.A., 1980), University of Connecticut (J.D., with honors, 1984).
Member of the State Bar of Florida. Godbold, Allen, Brown and Builder, P.A., Winter Park,

Florida.
1. See J. WssTrr & C. LownL,
WmsTART & LOwnuL).

THE LAW OF SpORTS

321 (1979) (hereinafter cited as

2. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.3 (1983).
3. Sobel, The Regulation of Player Agents, 5 ENT. L. REP. No. 10, at 3 (March, 1984)
(hereinafter cited as Sobel).
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law approach on the federal level, with registration and extensive
prior performance disclosure before an agency contract is entered
into, is the best solution to the problem because it fosters informed
and intelligent decision-making concerning the choice of an agent.

II.

THE CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM

There are two principle causes of the problem of agent abuse.
The first is the lack of requirements for entering the business.4
The second is the lack of information available to college athletes
with which to evaluate the qualifications, integrity and experience
of prospective agents. Because the typical athlete has little, if any,
understanding of the business world,5 he is often incapable of making such an evaluation.
Part of the blame for the problem can be placed on the ABA's
policy of maintaining restrictions against client solicitation which
preclude potential attorney-agents from making their services
known. At its August, 1983 national meeting, the ABA ratified
Rule 7.3:
DIRECT CONTACT WITH PROSPECTIVE CLIENTS
A lawyer may not solicit professional employment from a prospective client with whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship, by mail, in-person or otherwise, when a
significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain. The term "solicit" includes contact in person, by
telephone, or telegraph, by letter or other writing, or by other
communication directed to a specific recipient ...

The predecessor sections to Rule 7.3, which were more lenient with
respect to client solicitation, 7 drew heavy criticism as being in con4.

R. RUXIN. AN Amizm's Gums To Aaaprrs 22 (1983).

"Anyone can be an agent. Every frustrated jock, every accountant who is bored, every lawyer who is doing pig iron contracts feels that athletic representation could be a lot more
exciting, and it offers some vicarious thrills. The Hillside Strangler could be an agent."
See also Comment, The Agent-Athlete Relationship in Professionaland Amateur Sports:
The Inherent Potentialfor Abuse and the Need for Regulation, 30 BuwTALo L REV. 815-49
(1981).
5. WESTART & Lowm.L, supra note 1, at 321.
6. Supra note 2.
7. Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-103 and DR 2-104A (1980). The
predecessor rules were more lenient since they did not expressly prohibit direct mail solicitation as does Rule 7.3. For case law holding that direct mail solicitation by a lawyer of
clients with whom he has no existing relationship is constitutionally protected commercial
speech, see Koffler v. Joint Bar Association, 432 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1980). But cf. FLA. STAT. §
877.02 (1983), (making solicitation, in any form, a misdemeanor punishable by one year of
imprisonment or a one thousand dollar fine).
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flict with a basic tenet of a lawyer's professional responsibility,
namely ensuring that "every person in our society should have
ready access to independent professional services of a lawyer of integrity and competence." 8 The enactment of Rule 7.3 perpetuates
the two principal causes of agent abuse by preventing qualified attorneys from competing with non-attorney-agents in making their
services known to the athlete.
Accordingly, as one commentator described, "there exists a
'Catch-22' situation in the agent-athlete relationship; while an athlete would be better off being reprsented by an attorney-agent, the
ABA solicitation provisions make it easier for the non-lawyer to
obtain clients."' When one considers that most flagrant examples
of unscrupulous conduct involve non-attorney-agents, the ABA's
policy becomes absolutely indefensible.
The best illustration of the "Catch-22" situation comes from
the respective reactions of attorney and non-attorney-agents to the
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) rules prohibiting
college athletes form signing contracts with professional sports
teams. While attorney-agents have, because of several disciplinary
rules, complied with the NCAA rule, non-attorney-agents totally
disregard it. For example, in 1979 agent Mike Trope stated that:
The rules are ridiculous and they're not being followed by anybody ... why should I honor the NCAA rules when I'm not
even bound by them? And I don't intend to honor them, not
ever, unless Congress says all the rules of the NCAA are the laws
of the United States, and you can go to prison for ten years if
you break them. z°
Trope likely has a similar opinion of the NCAA's agent registration
plan which became effective April 18, 1984.11

III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS To AGENT ABUSE
A.

Relaxing ABA Anti-Solicitation Rules

A promising solution to the problem of dishonest and incompetent agents would be the relaxation of ABA anti-solicitation
rules. Despite repeated outcries for such a change from distin8. Freedman, Advertising and Solicitation by Lawyers: A Proposed Redraft of Canon
2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 4 HOisTRA L. Rzv. 183, 184.
9. Comment, supra note 4, at 832-33 (footnote omitted). Cf. S. GALLNER. PRO SPORTSTHe CoNTRer GAms 25 (1974) (describing the hardships endured by basketball player
David Brent whose college career was forfeited because of NCAA regulations).
10. Mcleese, A Whole New Ballgame for Lawyers, Student Lawyer, Oct. 1980, at 46.
11. N.Y. Times, April 19, 1984, §B at 19.
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guished scholars, 2 the ABA remains unpersuaded. At its August
1983 meeting, the ABA ratified Rule 7.3 and thus rejected the proposal of the Kutak Commission and the American Trial Lawyers
Association.' Both proposals would have opened the door to solicitation by attorney-agents in situations devoid of fraud and
overreaching.
The impetus for ABA code revision may have to come from
case law. An examination of both recent and established court decisions indicates that there is still hope for such a revision. In the
companion cases of Ohralik v. State Bar of Ohio14 and In re
8 , the Supreme
Primus"
Court applied the ABA solicitation rules to
two factual situations which are analogous to the athlete agency
situation. In Ohralik, the Court upheld as constitutional the application of Disciplinary Rules DR 2-103(A) and DR 2-104(A) to direct in-person solicitation by an attorney of two injured 18 year old
female accident victims. The Court reasoned that the state has a
"compelling" interest in preventing these aspects of solicitation
that involve fraud, undue influence, intimidation, overreaching and
other forms of vexatious conduct.16
In Primus, the Court found the application of DR 2-103(A)
and DR 2-104(A) to the solicitation by an American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) lawyer for indigent sterilization victims violative of
the first and fourteenth Amendments. 7 The Court reasoned that
solicitation of prospective litigants by non-profit organizations that
engage in litigation "as a form of political expression" and "political association" constitutes expressive and associational conduct
protected by the first amendment. 8
Most appropriate to the athlete-agent dilemma is Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in Ohralik.'9 In attempting to provide
guidance for activity "falling between the poles"' 0 represented by
the Ohralik and Primus cases, Marshall concluded that the first
12. See Note, Advertising, Solicitation and the Profession's Duty to Make Legal
Counsel Available, 81 YALE L. J. 1181 (1972); Note, Solicitation by the Second Oldest Profession: Attorneys and Advertising, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 77 (1973).
13. PROPOSED CODE FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY RULE 7.3
(1983), Insert American Bar Journal November, 1983 at 29 see also MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103A and DR 2-104A.
14. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
15. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
16. 436 U.S. at 468.
17. Id. at 439.

18. Id.
19. Id. at 468-77.
20. 436 U.S. at 468.
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amendment would protect "benign in-person commercial solicitation. 2 1 In a footnote, Marshall explained: "I mean solicitation by
advice and information that is truthful and that is presented in a
non-coercive, non-deceitful and dignified manner to a potential client who is emotionally and physically capable of making a rational
decision."' "2Justice Marshall reasoned that "rules against solicitation substantially impede the flow of important information to
consumers from those most likely to provide it-the practicing
'2 3
members of the Bar.
Even under a constrained interpretation, Marshall's concurring opinion seems to protect on-campus solicitation by attorneyagents under circumstances devoid of the potential for over-reaching. Such circumstances could exist for example, if college athletic
directors administered and supervised on-campus meetings between attorney-agents and prospective professional athletes. By
providing a forum for the supervised solicitation of athletes, the
athletic director would ensure that the athletes receive all the relevant information necessary for an informed choice concerning an
agent.' 4 Moreover, by arming the athlete with information in a
controlled environment, the athletic director would deter the "secret signing"' 5 of athletes in violation of NCAA rules. 26 Because it
would be augmented by the disciplinary powers of the state and
local bar associations, supervised on-campus solicitation by attorney-agents would actually further NCAA policy.' 7
B.

First Amendment Exemptions from Anti-Solicitation Rules

Another line of case law suggests the possibility of an exemption from the anti-solicitation rules for attorney-agents who solicit
athletes after gaining a recommendation from the respective professional league players associations. This may be a feasible solution since most players unions- have expressed the view that attorney-agents do a far better job in representing the interests of
21. Id. at 472.
22. Id. n.3.
23. Id. at 473.
24. Id.
25. "Secret Signing" is a term used to describe a college athlete's pre-graduation signing of a professional sports player contract. See Comment, supra note 4, at 828.
26. See S. GALLNER, supra note 9, at 101, where the author states that "the best deterrent to overreaching by attorneys will be clients armed with information about comparable
services available from other attorneys."
27. Id. at 826.
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players than do non-attorney-agents. 8 These unions have expressed, as a matter of union policy, their desire that members be
represented by attorney-agents.
Until 1982, the National Football League Players Association
(NFLPA) declined to fully exercise their authority under Section 9
of the National Labor Relations Act 29 to act as the "exclusive representative" of all employees in the certified unit for the purpose
of collective bargaining concerning wages, hours, and other conditions of employment. In an effort to combat the problem of agent
abuse the NFLPA, in its 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement,
retained the right to be the exclusive bargaining representative for
all players employed by NFL teams.30 Thus, the Association has
created a certification system under which a player's own agent is
required to become a registered agent of the NFLPA. With the
exercise of jurisdiction by the NFLPA over agents through its certification system, in-person-solicitation by certified attorney-agents
may be shielded from the anti-solicitation rules by the first amendment rights of free speech, assembly, and association. Indeed, the
following Supreme Court decisions lend support for this theory.
In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar,31 the Court considered the question of solicitation
in a case where a union's legal services plan resulted in channelling
all or substantially all of the railroad workers' personal injury
claims, on a private fee basis, to lawyers selected by the union and
recommended in its literature and at meetings. In upholding the
solicitation under the legal services plan, the Court reasoned that
the union's first amendment rights of free speech, petition and assembly necessarily include the right of workers personally or
through a special department of their Brotherhood to: 1) advise
members concerning their needs for legal assistance; 2) make suggestions as to appropriate counsel.32
In United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n.,3 the Illinois Bar Association brought suit against the union for unauthorized practice of law based on the union's employment of a Ii28. See Comment, supra note 4, at 842.
29. National Labor Relations Act § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1982).
30. See Comment, supra note 4, at 842.
31. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
32. The Court intimated that the participating lawyers were not soliciting at all. "The
railroad workers, by recommending competent lawyers to each other obviously are not
themselves engaging in the practice of law, nor are they nor the lawyers whom they select
parties to any solicitation" Id. at 6-7.
33. 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
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censed attorney to represent members in connection with worker's
compensation claims. 4 The Court upheld the union's plan on first
amendment grounds. In so holding, the Court rejected the notion
that the activity of the union and its counsel could not be shielded
by the first amendment because it did not involve litigation for
3
political purposes. 5
Finally, in United Transportation Union v. State Bar of
Michigan,6 the Court reversed a state court injunction prohibiting
a comprehensive union plan to institute personal injury claims.
Under the plan the union paid investigators to keep track of accidents, to visit injured members (taking contingent fee contracts
with them) and to urge members to engage named private attorneys who were selected by the union and who had agreed to charge
a fee set by prior agreement with the union. In approving the plan
in the face of the Michigan Bar's solicitation rules, the Court held
that "collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to
the courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First
' 3' 7
Amendment.
As applied to the NFLPA agent certification procedure,
Trainmen, Mine Workers, and TransportationUnion suggest that
solicitation by certified attorney-agents is immune from the antisolicitation rules. The certification procedure, like the legal services plans in Trainmen and its progeny, was designed to advise
union members concerning their needs for legal assistance and suggest appropriate counsel. Similarly, like the plans in Trainmen and
its progeny, the NFLPA certification system has the effect of channelling clients to particular attorneys approved by the association
as competent to handle the members' interests. That the NFLPA
may also certify competent non-attorney-agents does not destroy
the analogizing construction since the purpose of the certification
plan was to effectuate the association's policy of recommending at34. The court was persuaded by facts indicating that interests of union members were
being jeopardized by unscrupulous attorneys who often demanded 40-50% of the amount
recovered under the Worker's Compensation Act for attorney's fees. That agents are prone
to abuse athletes and have a 25 year history of such abuse may lead a court to analogize the
legal services plan in Mine Workers with a player association agent certification plan.
See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
35. The Court opined that "the litigation in question is, of course, not bound up with
political matters of acute social moment, as in Button, but the First Amendment does not
protect speech and assembly only to the extent it can be characterized as political. Great
secular causes, with small ones, are guarded." 389 U.S. at 223.
36. 401 U.S. 576 (1971).
37. Id. at 585.
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torney over non-attorney-agents.3 8
Moreover, the analogy remains intact even though the rights
sought to be protected by the certification plan do not involve redress for personal injury. The extent of first amendment protection
is the same for associational activity undertaken to secure rights of
union members in a court of law and associational activity undertaken to secure rights of union members at the bargaining unit

with management.8 '
Even though solicitation by certified agents may receive first
amendment protection coextensive with that afforded under
Trainmen and its progeny, its utility in combating agent abuse re-

mains questionable. The reason for the pessimism is the limited
jurisdiction of the players unions with respect to their bargaining

units.
In the Trainmen line of cases, the abuse sought to be reme38. As further support for this analogy, it should be noted that the NFLPA sponsors
legal seminars geared towards educating both lawyer and non-lawyer-agents in the proper
representation of professional athletes. Similarly, player associations provide salary information for and work with agents in areas ranging from developing arbitration strategy to
processing grievances. Ruxin, supra note 4, at 842. The difficulty arises however, when
player association officials also privately represent athletes in private negotiations with their
respective teams. For example, the executive directors of the hockey and basketball player
associations also represent individual athletes. In this context a court may refuse to grant
first amendment protection to the players association based on the theory that a conflict of
interest precludes the association from being the true champion of the collectivity of
players.
39. In these three cases, the Court tended to merge the rights of assembly and petition
into the speech clause, treating all three rights as elements of an inclusive right of freedom
of expression. Therefore, although certain conduct may call forth a denomination of petitioner assembly, there seems little question that no substantive issue turns upon whether
one is engaged in speech, assembly or petition. U.S. Constitution Revised and Annotated,
at 1034 (1972); cf. Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); see text and accompanying note
64 supra. The only other difference between the agent situation and that of the unions in
Trainmen and its progeny, is the absence in the former of important state or federal legislation. For example, in Trainmen, the activity of the union in establishing the legal services
plan was legitimated by the policies underlying the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45
U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982) and the Safety Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-43 (1982). At page 5 of
its opinion the Court held thatIt cannot be seriously doubted that the First Amendment's guarantees of free
speech, petition and assembly give railroad workers the right to gather together
for the lawful purposes of helping and advising one another in asserting the
rights Congress gave them in the Safety Appliance Act and the Federal Employers' Liability Act, statutory rights which would be vain and futile if the workers
could not talk together freely as to the best course to follow.
Although California has enacted an Agent Registration Act, CAL LAB. CODE §§ 1500-1547
(West 1981), it cannot be compared with the Federal Employers' Liability Act or Safety
Appliance Act in terms of popularity or clout. Therefore, absent enactment of a comprehensive federal registration act for agents like the one proposed herein, the protection afforded
the union in Trainmen may not be available to the Players Associations.
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died was not imposed on workers until after they entered the protective environment of the bargaining unit. In the athlete-agent
context, that abuse takes place before the athlete joins the bargaining unit. Consequently, by the time the player joins the union
he has already signed an agency contract and has had that agent
negotiate his first employment contract with a professional team.
Unless the NFLPA can, in the face of significant labor and antitrust law problems, persuade the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) to expand their bargaining unit to include college athletes, the efforts of the NFLPA and other player unions to combat
agent abuse will come too late.4
C.

State Regulation of Agent Abuse: The California Approach

Recognizing that many of its college athletes were being victimized by unscrupulous agents, the California Legislature approved California Labor Code Section 1500, the Lockyer Act."1 The
statute requires all agents, except lawyers "acting as legal counsel,"
to register annually with the Labor Commission, pay a licensing
fee, and deposit a $10,000 security bond.2 The statute empowers
the State Labor Commission to investigate the moral character of
any applicant and, upon proper notice and hearing, refuse to grant
a license or suspend or revoke a license."3
While the California statute has been praised because of its
focus on the practices of non-attorney-agents," it is not likely to
serve the purpose for which it was designed. Aside from the fact
that it is currently being ignored by California agents," the
Lockyer Act regulates too narrow an area of conduct. Perhaps the
most significant problem with the California Act is its lack of prior
40. Sobel, supra note 3, at 8. See Comment, supra note 4. See also Boris V. U.S.F.L.,
slip op. (S.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 1984) holding that the U.S.F.L.'s eligibility rule constitutes a per
se violation of the Sherman Act. With the Boris decision, player associations will have to
expand their bargaining unit to include college sophmores. This assumes that the freshman
year will be used as a try-out year for professional teams.
41. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1500-1547 (West 1981).
42. CAL. LAB CODE § 1519 (West 1984).
43. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1512-13 (West 1984).
44. Comment, supra note 4, at 834.
45. Under CAL. LAB. CODE § 1545 (West 1981) an agent must file a copy of his registration certificate with the athlete's school "prior to communicating with or contacting in any
manner any student concerning an agency contract." Thus, a situation could arise where the
agent files his certificate with the school on September 1, and knocks on the athlete's door
on September 2nd. It is highly unlikely that the athlete is informed of the agent's qualifications by the time he invites the agent into his room. Moreover, it is unlikely that anyone in
the Athletic Department or Administration has read the certificate. Thus, the Act's filing
requirement affords the athlete little, if any, protection.

Published by Institutional Repository, 1984

9

University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 4

ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW JOURNAL

62

[Vol. 2:53

performance disclosure. Section 1511(c) of the Lockyer Act only
requires that the agent list his business or occupation for the two
years immediately preceding the date of application. The information provided by Section 1511(c) is rendered ineffective since it
may not reach the athlete in time to enable an informed decision
regarding the choice of an agent. Thus, disclosure under the
Lockyer Act is both too little and too late.
D.

The Securities Law Approach

In exposing the weaknesses of the NFLPA agent certification
plan, the NCAA agent registration program and the Lockyer Act,
two themes become evident. The first indicates that a plan to regulate athlete-agents must be administered by a federal agency with
significant enforcement powers. The second demonstrates that the
legislation governing athlete-agents must emphasize full disclosure
as a method of combating athlete-agent abuse.
Disclosure is a central aspect of national policy in the field of
securities regulation. The emphasis on disclosure in our securities
laws is based on two considerations.4 6 The first consideration assures that investors and speculators have access to enough information to enable them to arrive at their own rational decisions.
The second rests on the belief that appropriate publicity tends to
deter questionable practices and to elevate standards of business
conduct. The objective of the Securities Act of 19334' is to produce
a document which tells a prospective purchaser the things he really
ought to know before buying a security; one he can examine in his
home or in his office. The proposed National Athlete-Agent Disclosure Act (the Act), is the embodiment of these considerations in
the area of athlete-agent regulation.
Like the Securities Act of 1933, the theory behind the Act is
that informed, intelligent decisions respecting the choice of an
agent come only after careful and extensive examination of that
agent's prior performance and educational qualifications. Toward
this end, sections 102 and 105 of the Act combine to establish a
twenty day period during which time the athlete will have in his
possession a substantial disclosure document detailing the agent's
experience in the field of athlete representation, educational qualifications and similar information with respect to individuals with
whom the agent is and has been affiliated. Only upon the expiraSzcumrras REGULATION: MATERIALS FOR A BAsic COURSE 74 (1980).
Id. at 82; 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1982).

46. D. RATmNE.
47.

http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol2/iss1/4

10

Sullivan: Remedying Athlete-Agent Abuse: A Securities Law Approach

1984]

REMEDYING ATHLETE-AGENT ABUSE

tion of the twenty day waiting period will the agent's registration
ecome effective (pursuant to section 101(c)) allowing him to solicit
the athlete in-person in an effort to obtain his signature on an
agency contract. Although the Act requires the agent to file only
one registration statement (section 104) and only one disclosure
statement (section 102), it contemplates an effective date for inperson solicitation for each and every athlete the agent wishes to
pursue. In this manner, the Act views in-person solicitation of each
individual athlete by an agent like a distinct and separate offering
of a new security by an issuer. Section 102, subsections (b)(7) and
(b)(8) require that the agent describe all fees which the athlete is
required to pay throughout his relationship with the agent.
Section 103 provides that the agent must obtain a surety bond
or establish a trust account in each state in which he does business
in an amount equal to twenty-five percent of the value of all professional sports employment contracts negotiated in that state or
fifty thousand dollars, whichever is greater. This is designed to act
both as security against agent embezzlement and as malpractice
insurance. According to section 103, the bond or trust account
would cover damages caused by fraudulent practices and
negligence.
Section 104 provides that a prospective agent must submit an
application for registration to the Commission disclosing his name
and address, experience relating to the representation of athletes,
copies of any contracts, services to be offered and any other information that the Commission may request. Pursuant to subsection
(b) of section 104 the Commission will issue a certificate of registration at which time the agent may send a disclosure statement to
a prospective athlete pursuant to section 102. Subsection (d) of
section 104 requires that the agent amend his registration to include material changes in information.
Section 105 prohibits the agent from entering into an agency
contract with an athlete in derogation of the time established for
such solicitation by the Act. Pursuant to section 105, the agent
cannot sign an athlete to an agency contract unless: 1) the agent is
registered; 2) the athlete has had twenty days in which to examine
the disclosure document; and 3) the agent's registration has been
declared effective with respect to the particular athlete sought to
be signed by the agent.
Provision is made in section 106 for the revocation or suspension of an agent's registration. Section 106 also provides for a stop
order denying the effectiveness of an agent's registration as it relates to the solicitation of a particular athlete. Grounds for the is-
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suance of a stop order, revocation or suspension are largely discretionary and focus on the necessity of protecting any athlete or
prospective athlete. Section 107 also addresses registration.
Sections 108 and 109 delineate the investigative and enforcement powers of the Commission in administering the Act. These
include cease and desist orders, standing in the federal courts to
obtain injunctive relief, court orders imposing fines of one thousand dollars upon agents who fail to observe a cease and desist
order and orders of restitution. The Act's section 110 imposes a
twenty-five thousand dollar fine, a five year term of imprisonment
or both for each willful violation of the Act.
Section 111 allows the athlete to void any agency contract and
receive all sums already paid to the agent if the agent uses any
untrue or misleading statement in the solicitation of the athlete, or
fails to comply with the disclosure requirements of section 102.
Subsection (b) of section 111 provides for a private cause of action
for an athlete based on an agent's breach of contract. Subsection
(b) also provides for reasonable attorney's fees in connection with
such an action. Subsection (d) of section 111 allows any athlete
damaged by an agent's violation of the Act, or breach of contract,
to bring an action to recover damages against the bond or trust
account provided for in section 103. Subsection (i) of section 111
renders void any stipulation or provision in any agency contract
binding an athlete to waive compliance with any provision of the
Act, its regulations, or orders issued under the Act pursuant to section 112.
Provision is made in section 114 for the annual renewal of an
agent's registration upon payment to the Commission of a one
hundred dollar fee. Section 114 also provides for the amendment
of all disclosure documents filed under the Act. Failure to do so
will result in the termination of the agent's registration.
Because the Act seeks to regulate only the solicitation of athletes by individuals who currently answer to no one, it provides
liberal exemptions. First, the Act would exempt broker-dealers,4 8
who are regulated by section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD),
when they limit their services to conduct covered by the Securities
Exchange Act. Second, the Act would exempt investment advisers
48. The 1934 Act defines a "broker" as a "person engaged in the business of buying
and selling securities for the account of others," 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)(4) (1982). While it defines
"dealer" as "any person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for his own
account." 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)(5)(1982).
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who limit their services to conduct regulated by the Investment
Adviser's Act of 1940,19 or state banking laws. Finally, the Act
would exempt licensed attorneys who: 1) limit their services to the
negotiation of a professional sports service contract;50 and 2) do
not solicit athletes as clients.
There are four principal reasons why the proposed Act is superior to existing regulatory measures. First, because it contains significant enforcement provisions and calls for administration by a
federal agency. The Act provides the deterrent effect lacking in the
NCAA and California registration systems.5 '
Second, it calls for administration on the federal level; the Act
creates a uniform body of law in the area of athlete-agent regulation. Nothing would be more expensive or chaotic than a continuation of the trend of agent regulation by individual states."'
Third, since the Act regulates agent solicitation of college athletes, it fills the gaps currently left open by players association
agent certification plans. This is especially compelling in view of
the insurmountable labor and anti-trust law problems associated
with expanding players associations' bargaining units to include
college athletes.58
49. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80c-3; cf. Finn v. Parish, 644 F.2d 360 (7th Cir. 1981).
50. The proposed Act would promote resistance from the organized bar to the extent
that it regulates and seeks to sanction solicitation by attorneys. The California Act met with
similar resistance. See Sobel, supra note 3, at 6. However, if the Act was enacted by Congress the organized bar would have little leverage for deterring members from soliciting athletes within the guidelines of the Act. With respect to the lawyer exemption, its requirements are conjunctive. That is, the attorney must limit his services to the negotiation of
player contracts and must have obtained the athlete through means other than solicitation.
51. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. See also 1984 SPoaTS INDUs. Nzws 24
(John Leavens, NCAA assistant director for legislative services, stated that the NCAA "can
do little to encourage agent compliance").
52. To date, three states other than California have considered adopting player agent
laws. They are New York, Texas and Indiana. Sobel, supra note 3, at 7. It seems that,
notwithstanding Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), professional
sports constitutes interstate commerce. Cf. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S.
445 (1957). Accordingly, in order to avoid a plethora of litigation on difficult questions of
constitutional law and conflicts of law, federal legislation should be enacted in this area.
53. The labor law problem is that the definition of the "bargaining unit" in 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(b) (1982) speaks in terms of a unit comprised of "employees" and 29 U.S.C. § 152(3)
(1982) defines "employees" as "any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of,
or in connection with any current labor despite or because of any unfair labor practice." It
does not contemplate athletes not yet working for a particular employer. The anti-trust
problem is that the NFLPA could lose its labor exemption under the anti-trust laws. See
generally 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1982); 29 U.S.C. §§ 52, 104, 105, 113 (1982). In Mackey v. National
Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), the court established a three-part test to
qualify for a labor exemption. First, the restraint of trade (in this case the agent certification plan) must affect only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship. Second, the
agreement sought to be exempted must involve a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.
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Finally, by sanctioning in-person solicitation by attorneyagents, the Act would ameliorate the "Catch-22" situation perpetuated by the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility. 4 Under the
Act, once their respective registrations are declared effective with
respect to a particular athlete, the attorney and non-attorneyagent stand on equal ground and would be left to their own devices
to obtain the athlete as a client.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the proposed Athlete-Agent Disclosure Act
would be the most effective method of remedying the problem of
athlete-agent abuse. Because it arms the athlete with information
about comparable services available from numerous agents, the Act
fosters informed and intelligent decision-making concerning the
choice of an agent. Moreover, it regulates solicitation of college
athletes; the Act protects those most likely to be victimized by unscrupulous agents. Finally, because it contains significant enforcement provisions and calls for administration by a federal agency,
the Act provides the deterrent effect which existing forms of agent
regulation simply cannot provide.**

Third, the agreement sought to be exempted must be the product of bona fide arms-length
bargaining. The NFLPA certification plan would fail the first requirement of the Mackey
test. The plan would affect college athletes who are not currently, and cannot be, parties to
the NFLPA collective bargaining agreement with NFL management council. See A. Farnsworth, Herschel Walker v. National Footbal League: A Hypothetical Lawsuit Challenging
the Propriety of the NFL's Four-or-Five Year Rule Under the Sherman Act, 9 PEPPERDINE
L. Rxv. 603, 620-24 (1982).
54. See supra note 12 and acompanying text.
** The author does not indicate provisions in the proposed statute for the procedure to
appeal the Commission's decisions, nor which court would have jurisdiction to hear such

appeals.
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THE ATHLETE-AGENT DISCLOSURE ACT
Section 100. Definitions. When used in this Act, unless the
context otherwise requires:
A. "Commission" means the Federal Trade Commission or
any person acting under the authority of the Federal
Trade Commission with respect to the enforcement of
this Act.
B. "Athlete" means any individual who is the subject of solicitation by an athlete-agent in connection with the services listed in paragraph C of this section.
C. "Athlete-Agent" means any person who, as an independent contractor, directly or indirectly recruits or solicits
any athlete to enter into any agency contract or professional sports service contract, or for a fee procures, offers,
promises, or otherwise attempts to obtain employment
for any athlete with a professional sport team. "AthleteAgent" also means any person who seeks endorsements
for any athlete, manages money for any athlete or gives
investment advice to any athlete, provided however, that
persons already registered under Federal or State Securities or Banking laws need not register under this Act with
respect to services rendered to an athlete which are regulated by said Securities or Banking laws; provided further, that the definition of "Athlete-Agent" shall not include licensed attorneys who do not solicit athletes as
clients and who limit their services to the negotiation of
sports service contracts.
D. "Agency Contract" means any contract or agreement pursuant to which a person authorizes or empowers an athlete-agent to negotiate or solicit on behalf of such person
with one or more professional sport teams for the employment of such person by one or more professional
sport teams.
E. "Professional Sport Services Contract" means any contract or agreement pursuant to which a person is employed or agrees to render services as a player on a professional sport team.
Section 101. Registration of Athlete-Agents.
Consent to Service of Process.
A.

Prior to the solicitation, whether by telephone, mail, in-
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person or through a third person, of an athlete, the athlete-agent shall register by:
(1) filing a copy of the disclosure statement required by
section 102;
(2) furnishing a bond in accordance with the provisions
of section 103;
(3) providing a sworn to and certified statement containing the information required by section 104;
(4) providing, in accordance with subsection B of this
section, the Attorney General of each state in which
the athlete-agent does. business with an irrevocable
consent, appointing the respective Attorney General
to be his attorney to receive service of any legal process in any noncriminal suit, action or proceeding
which arises under this Act, or any regulation or order adopted or issued under the provisions of this
Act; and
(5) submitting a nonrefundable registration fee of
$1,000 in accordance with subsection B of section
104.
B. Every athlete-agent proposing to solicit athletes either
personally or through a third person for the purpose of
acting as the athlete's representative with respect to any
of the activities described in subsection C of section 100
shall file with the Attorney General of each state in which
the athlete-agent does business, an irrevocable consent
appointing said Attorney General or his successor in office to be his attorney to receive service of any lawful process in any noncriminal suit, action or proceeding against
him or his agent which arises under this Act, or any regulation or order adopted or issued under this Act after the
consent has been filed. Service may be made by leaving a
copy of the process in the office of the Attorney General.
C. (1) Except as hereinafter provided, the registration of
an athlete-agent under this Act shall become effective on the twentieth day after the filing thereof or
such later date as the Commission may determine,
having due regard to the adequacy of information
respecting the athlete-agent theretofore available to
the athlete.
(2) If it appears that a registration statement is on its
face incomplete or inaccurate in any material respect, the Commission may, after notice by personal
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service or the sending of a confirmed telegraph notice not later than ten days after the filing of the
registration statement, and after an opportunity for
a hearing within ten days after such notice by personal service or the sending of such telegraph notice,
issue an order prior to the effective date of registration refusing to permit such statement to become effective until it has been amended in accordance with
such order. When such statement has been amended
in accordance with such order the Commission shall
so declare and the registration shall become effective
at the time provided in subsection (1) or upon the
date of such declaration, whichever date is the later.
Section 102. Disclosure to the Subject Athlete Required.
A.

At least twenty days prior to the time the athlete signs an
agency contract but not before the certification of the
athlete-agent's registration statement under paragraph B
of section 104, the athlete-agent shall provide the athlete
with a written document, the cover sheet of which shall
be entitled in at least ten-point bold fact print "Disclosure Required By Federal Law." Under this title shall appear the statement in at least ten-point type that "The
Federal Trade Commission does not approve, recommend, endorse or sponsor any athlete-agent." The twenty
day period shall begin to run when the Commission is
satisfied, from proof provided by the athlete-agent, that a
disclosure statement satisfying the requirements of this
section was sent or given to the athlete.
B. The disclosure document shall contain the following information which shall be presented in a single document
in the order set forth in this subsection and shall include
a comment which positively or negatively responds to
each disclosure item required to be in the disclosure document by use of a statement which fully incorporates the
information required within such document:
(1) (a) The athlete-agent's name, address and principal place of business and that of any athlete
agency firm with whom the athlete-agent is affiliated; and
(b) the name under which the athlete-agent intends to do business.
(2) The business experience of the athlete-agent, includ-
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ing:
(a) the length of time he or she has conducted
business as an athlete-agent;
(b) the number of agency contracts entered into
between the athlete-agent and an athlete;
(c)
the number of professional sports service contracts negotiated by the athlete-agent;
(d) the extent of the athlete-agent's investment or
financial management experience; and
(e) similar information regarding the employees of
any athlete-agency firm listed in subsection
B(1)(a) of this section.
The educational background of the athlete-agent including but not limited to:
(a) legal degrees;
(b) accounting degrees or certification;
(c)
undergraduate degrees in business administration; and
(d) similar information regarding the employment
of any athlete-agency firm listed in subsection
B(1)(a) of this section.
A statement disclosing who, if any, of the persons
listed in subsection B(1)(a), including the athleteagent:
(a) has, at any time during the previous seven
years, been convicted of a felony or pleaded
nolo contendere to a felony charge if such felony charge involved fraud, including but not
limited to, a violation of any securities law or
unfair or deceptive practices of law, embezzlement, fraudulent conversion, or misappropriation of property;
(b) has, at any time during the previous seven
years, been held liable in a civil action resulting in a final judgment or has settled out of
court any civil action or is a party to any civil
action:
(i)
involving allegation of fraud, including
but not limited to violations of any securities law or unfair or deceptive practices law, embezzlement, fraudulent conversion, or misappropriation of property;
or
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which was brought by a present or former athlete and which involves or involved the agent-athlete relationship.
(5) A statement disclosing who, if any, of the persons
listed in subsection B(1)(a) at any time during the
previous seven years has:
(a) filed a petition for liquidation or reorganization under Federal Bankruptcy law;
(b) been adjudged bankrupt;
(c)
been reorganized due to insolvency; or
(d) been a principal, director, executive officer or
partner of any other person that has so filed or
was adjudged or reorganized, during or within
one year after the period that such person held
such position with such other person. If so, the
athlete-agent shall set forth the name and location of the person having so filed or having
been so adjudged or reorganized, the date and
any other material facts.
(6) A factual description of the services offered by the
athlete-agent.
(7) A statement setting forth the fee which the athlete
is required to pay the athlete-agent or his firm.
(8) A statement describing any recurring fees in connection with the services described in paragraph 6 of
this subsection.
(9) A statement disclosing:
(a) the total number of athlete-agency contracts
the athlete-agent is obligated under;
(b) any financial interest the athlete-agent has in
any professional sports team;
(c)
the number of athlete-agency contracts during
the preceding three years that were voluntarily
terminated or not renewed by athletes within
or at the conclusion of the term of the athleteagency contract; and
(d) with respect to the disclosure required by subparagraph (c) of this subsection, the disclosure
statement shall include a general categorization of the reasons for such refusals to renew
or terminations, including but not limited to
the following categories:
(i)
failure to prudently advise with respect
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to investments or money management;
failure to obtain full market value for
the athlete's services;
conflicts of interest with the athlete; and
excessive fees.

Section 103. Surety Bond or Trust Account Required.
A.

B.

Unless exempted by subsection B of this section, the athlete-agent must obtain a surety bond issued by a surety
company in every state in which he does business or must
establish a trust account with a licensed and insured
bank or savings institution located in every state in which
he does business. The amount of the bond or trust account shall be fifty thousand dollars or an amount equal
to twenty-five percent of the value of all professional
sports service contracts which the athlete-agent has negotiated in the state, whichever is greater. The bond or
trust account shall cover damages caused any athlete due
to the athlete-agent's misstatement, misrepresentation,
fraud, deceit, or negligence.
Any athlete-agent who maintains professional malpractice insurance in an amount in excess of that required by
subsection A above need not obtain a surety bond or establish a trust account.

Section 104. Application for Registration.
A.

Unless exempted by the proviso to subsection C of section 100, any athlete-agent intending to solicit, as a client, any athlete must register with the Commission and
file an application which shall contain the following documents and information:
(1) the official name and address and principal place of
business of the athlete-agent and that of any firm
with whom the athlete-agent is affiliated, if any;
(2) the business experience of the athlete-agent and
that of the persons employed by the firm with whom
the athlete-agent is affiliated, including the length of
time such athlete-agent has conducted business as
an athlete-agent;
(3) a copy of any contracts or other documents relating
to the services offered by the athlete-agent;
(4) a factual description of the services offered by the
athlete-agent or members of any firm with whom he
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or she is affiliated;
(5) any other information the Commission in its discretion reasonably requires.
B. Upon satisfactory submission of the information and documents required by subsection A of this section, and all
information and documents required by sections 102 and
103, and the payment of a registration fee of one thousand dollars, the Commission shall issue a certificate stating that the athlete-agent has been registered.
C. The Commission may from time to time by regulation or
order exempt any athlete-agent for the reasons stated in
the proviso to subsection C of section 100.
D. The athlete-agent shall immediately notify the Commission of any material change in information contained in
the application for registration and shall make appropriate amendments of the disclosure statement.
Section 105. Prohibited Solicitation Activity.
No athlete-agent shall solicit an athlete to enter into an agency
agreement unless:
A. the athlete-agent has been registered in accordance with
section 104;
B. the athlete has had in his possession for at least twenty
days, the disclosure statement required by section 102;
and
C. the athlete-agent's registration has been declared effective by the Commission in accordance with paragraph C
of section 101.
Section 106. Registration Suspended or Revoked.
A. The Commission may issue a stop order denying effectiveness to, or suspending or revoking the effectiveness of,
any athlete-agent registration if it finds:
(1) that such order is necessary for the protection of any
athlete or prospective athlete;
(2) that the registration of the athlete-agent as of its effective date or as of any earlier date in the case of an
order denying effectiveness, is incomplete in any material respect or contains any statement which is, in
light of the circumstances under which it was made,
false or misleading with respect to any material fact;
or
(3) that any provision of this Act or any regulation, or-
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der or condition lawfully adopted, issued or imposed
under this chapter has been willfully violated by an
athlete-agent.
B. The Commission may, by order, summarily postpone or
suspend the effectiveness of the registration of an athleteagent pending final determination of any proceeding
under this Act. Upon entry of such order the Commission
shall promptly notify the registrant that the order has
been entered, and of the reasons for such entry, and that
within fifteen days after receipt by the Commission of the
written request the matter will be set down for a hearing.
If no hearing is requested and none is ordered by the
Commission, such order will remain in effect until modified or vacated by the Commission.
C. No stop order may be entered under this section except
as provided in subsection B of this subsection without:
(1) appropriate prior notice to the registrant;
(2) opportunity for a hearing; and
(3) the issuance of written findings of fact and conclusions of law by the Commission.
Section 107. Registration Does Not Imply Approval.
A.

That an application for registration under this Act has
been filed or that an athlete-agent is effectively registered
shall not constitute a finding by the Commission that any
document filed under this Act is true, complete and not
misleading. No such fact shall mean that the Commission
has passed in any way upon the qualification of, or recommended or given approval to, any athlete-agent.
B. No athlete-agent shall make or cause to be made any representation inconsistent with subsection A of this section
to any prospective athlete.
Section 108. Investigations. Powers of the Commission.
The Commission may make such public or private investigations as
it deems necessary to determine whether any athlete-agent has violated, or is about to violate, any provision of this Act, or any regulation or order adopted or issued thereunder, or to aid in the enforcement of this Act.
Section 109. Violations. Remedies and Enforcement Powers
of the Commission.
Whenever it appears to the Commission that any athlete-agent is
violating, or is about to violate, any of the provisions of this chap-
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ter or any regulation order adopted or issued under this Act, the
Commission may:
order the athlete-agent or agents to cease and desist from
the violations of the provisions of this Act or of the regulations, rules or orders adopted or issued under this Act.
After such order is issued, the athlete-agent named in
such order may, within fourteen days after receipt of the
order, file a written request for a hearing;
B. bring an action in Federal Court to enjoin the acts or
practices constituting a violation and to enforce compliance with this Act or any regulation or order adopted or
issued under this Act;
C. seek a court order imposing a fine not to exceed one thousand dollars per violation against any athlete-agent to
have violated a cease or desist order issued by it;
D. in addition to any other remedies provided by this Act,
apply to the court hearing the matter under this Act, for
an order of restitution whereby the defendants in such
action shall be ordered to make restitution of those sums
of money shown by the Commission to have been obtained by them in violation of any of the provisions of
this Act, plus interest at the rate of eight percent per annum. Such restitution shall be payable to the persons
whose assets were obtained in violation of any provision
of this Act; and
E. any time after the issuance of a cease and desist order
provided for in subsection A of this section, accept an
agreement by any athlete-agent charged with violating
any provision of this Act to enter into a written consent
order in lieu of an adjudicative hearing.
A.

Section 110. Penalties.
Any athlete-agent who willfully violates the provisions of
section 105 shall be fined for each violation a maximum
of twenty-five thousand dollars, or imprisonment for not
more than five years or both.
Section 111. Contracts Voidable. Athlete's remedies.
A.

If an athlete-agent uses any untrue or misleading statement in the solicitation of an athlete, or fails to give the
proper disclosure in the manner required by section 102,
then, upon written notice to such athlete-agent, the ath-
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lete may void the agency contract and shall be entitled to
receive from such athlete-agent all sums paid to such athlete-agent.
Any athlete injured by a violation of this Act by an athlete-agent's breach of contract subject to this Act, or any
obligation arising therefrom, may bring an action for recovery of damages, including reasonable attorney's fees.
Upon complaint of any person, including but not limited
to an athlete, that an athlete-agent has violated the provisions of this Act, the federal district court for the district in which either the athlete or the athlete-agent is
located shall have jurisdiction to enjoin the defendant or
defendants from further violations.
Any athlete who is damaged by any violation of this Act,
or by the athlete-agent's breach of contract or of any obligation arising therefrom, may bring an action against
the bond or trust account provided for in section 103 to
recover damages suffered.
The rights and remedies provided by this Act shall be in
addition to any other rights or remedies provided by law
or equity.
Every cause of action under this Act shall survive the
death of any person who might have been a plaintiff or
defendant.
No person may sue under this section more than six years
after the breach of a contract covered by this Act.
No athlete-agent who has made or engaged in the performance of any contract in violation of any provision of
this Act, or who has acquired any purported right under
such contract with knowledge of the facts by reason of
which its making or performance was in violation, may
base any cause of action on the contract.
Any condition, stipulation or provision binding any athlete to waive compliance with any provision of this Act,
or any regulation, or order adopted or issued under this
Act is void.

Section 112. Commission to Adopt Regulations.
The Commission may from time to time adopt, amend and rescind
such regulations as are necessary to carry out the provisions of this
Act.
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Section 113.
Applications.
A.
B.

Commission

to Keep

Register

of

A document is filed when it is received by the Commission.
The Commission shall keep a register of all applications
for registration which are or have ever been effective
under this Act and all denial, suspension or revocation
orders which have ever been entered under this Act. Such
register shall be open for public inspection.

Section 114. Renewal of Registration. Amended disclosure
document.
Within one hundred and twenty days following the end of the athlete-agent's most recent fiscal year and each year thereafter, each
athlete-agent who has been registered under this Act shall submit
to the Commission:
A
B

an annual renewal registration fee of one hundred dollars;
an amendment to the information contained in the athlete-agent's application filed in accordance with the requirements of subparagraph A of section 104; and
C an amended disclosure document filed in accordance with
the requirements of sections 101 and 102. In the event
that the seller fails to submit the fee and information
within the time period and in accordance with requirements of this Act, the registration of the athlete-agent
shall be deemed terminated.
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